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Discarding the Doctrine of Supervisory Domination:
New Solutions to an Old Conflict of Interest
By Lynn Cox*
PeterMartin Nelson**

Introduction
Supervisors

dual identity in the labor movement, in which they

serve both as employees and as employer representatives, poses a perplexing conflict of interest. Congress has attempted to ameliorate this
conflict by denying to supervisors the fights guaranteed to employees2
under the National Labor Relations Act and vesting employers with

plenary power to control the union activities of their supervisors. Frequently, however, this power remains unexercised as employers acquiesce in the union membership of their supervisors. The National Labor
A.B., 1976, University of California at Berkeley. Member, Third Year Class.
** B.A., 1976, Williams College. Member, Third Year Class.
1. The National Labor Relations Act § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) provides this
definition: "The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of
such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."
The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act of 1935), ch. 372, §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), (hereinafter cited as "The Act", NLRA, or Wagner Act), as amendedby the LaborManagement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act of 1947), ch. 120, §§ 101-707, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) [hereinafter cited as Taft-Hartley Act], as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffm Act of 1959), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519,
as amendedby the 1974 Health Care Institution Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat.
395 (1974). These statutes are codified in 29 U.S.C. § 141-187 (1976).
2. The definition of employee in the National Labor Relations Act excludes "any
individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individualemployed as a
superviror,or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as
amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
Section 14(a) provides: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a
supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer
subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective
bargaining." National Labor Relations Act § 14(a), 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976).
*
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Relations Board 3 and reviewing courts have been left with difficult

questions concerning what degree of supervisorial participation in the
collective bargaining process creates an untenable conflict of interest,

and what solutions should be applied toward a resolution of this
conflict.
During 1975-1977 the National Labor Relations Board heard a
rash 6of cases 4 in which certifications 5 of petitioning nurses' associations as collective bargaining representatives for nurses were contested
by their employer-hospitals. The employers alleged that the nurses associations were not bona fide labor organizations 7 within the meaning
3. The National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as "Board" or
"NLRB", consists of five members appointed by the President of the United States for fiveyear terms. The Board was created by National Labor Relations Act, ch. 272, § 3, 49 Stat.
449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976)). See note 1 supra. Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976), authorizes the Board to delegate to
its regional directors its powers "to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question
of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret ballot." Unless specified to
mean the Regional Director, reference to the Board or citation to cases before the Board,
means the five-member National Labor Relations Board sitting in Washington, D.C.
4. Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1976); Sisters of Charity of Providence,
St. Ignatius Province, d/b/a St. Patrick Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 799 (1976); St. Rose de Lima
Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1976); Oak Ridge Hosp. of the United Methodist Church,
220 N.L.R.B. 49 (1975); Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., d/b/a Anne Arundel Gen.
Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 848 (1975), rey'd, 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977).
These cases involved employer-hospitals' resistance to certification of the California,
Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and Maryland state nurses' associations, respectively.
5. Representation hearings usually arise as a result of an employer refusing to recognize a union as the exclusive representative of its employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining. The procedure is detailed in National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1) (1976). See note 79 infra.
6. Nurses' associations, or state nurses' associations are the state affiliates of the
American Nurses' Association (hereinafter ANA), a professional association whose membership is composed primarily of registered nurses. The purposes of the ANA read as follows: "The purposes of the American Nurses' Association shall be to foster high standards of
nursing practice, promote the professional and educational advancement of nurses, and promote the welfare of nurses to the end that all people may have better nursing care. These
purposes shall be unrestricted by considerations of nationality, race, creed, color, or sex."
"Purposes of the American Nurses' Association," in California Nurses' Association Articles
of Incorporation/Purposes/Philosophy/State Bylaws/Standing Rules, at ii (1977 pamphlet).
The 18 state affiliates express similar philosophies. See "Philosophy of the California
Nurses' Association," in id.
Although the nurses associations exist to promote professional as well as economic
goals for their membership, primary attention in this Note is paid to the economic, or collective bargaining, functions of the association.
7. "Bona fide labor organization" is a term of art used by the Board when examining
a charge that supervisory membership in a labor organization creates a conflict of interest
which renders it incapable of representing its nonsupervisory membership in good
faith-hence the term "bona fide." That a labor organization be found "bona fide" is ancil-
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of section 2(5)8 of the National Labor Relations Act, because they were
dominated by supervisors. The Board consistently rejected the employ-

ers' arguments and certified the nurses associations as collective bargaining representatives, after making findings that appropriate
structural safeguards existed in the nurses associations to obviate significant potential of supervisory domination. On August 31, 1977, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals delivered its decision in NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency HospitalAssociation,Inc., d/b/a Anne Arundel Gen9 which reversed the Board by finding the Anne Arundel
eralHospital,

collective bargaining unit of the Maryland Nurses Association to be
dominated by supervisors. This decision has called into question both
the Board's factual determinations of supervisory domination and the

policy against supervisory domination itself.
The doctrine of supervisory domination has no direct basis in the
NLRA. It is a Board extension of the section 8(a)(2)10 policy prohibiting employer domination of unions. Supervisory domination has over
time acquired a meaning of its own, and finding supervisory domina-

tion of unions has become an object in itself, its roots forgotten.
It is time to examine the development of this Board-created policy.

This Note will trace its evolution from its origin as a per se rule protecting against employer domination, to its current applications in which it
is alleged by employers themselves. The original legislative concerns
underlying this policy will be reexamined in an attempt to determine
whether current implementation of the policy addresses these concerns
today.
The Note concludes that the doctrine of supervisory domination

has become alienated from its original purpose and must be discarded.
Rather than protecting employees' free choice of their bargaining representative, the doctrine now serves to stall the collective bargaining
lary to those qualifications made explicit in the § 2(5) definition. See note 8 infra See
generally text accompanying notes 80-129 infra.
8. Section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1977), defines
a labor organization as follows: "The term 'labor organization' means any organization of
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
This definition was intentionally drawn broadly to include employees' committees. S.
REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprintedin 2 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2306
(1949) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HiST. NLRA]. Such inclusion negates employer defenses
to a § 8(a)(2) charge that the organization allegedly dominated or supported is not a labor
organization within the definition of the National Labor Relations Act. See Note, Section
8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and Committees, 9 STAN. L. REv. 351 (1957).
9. 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). See text accompanying notes 35-36 infra.
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process. In its place, the Note suggests adoption of several proposals
designed to safeguard both employers and employees from the conflicts
inhering in their supervisors.

Supervisors Exclusion From the NLRA
In the early years of the NLRA, the status of supervisors was in
constant flux. Congress did not specifically exclude supervisors from
the section 2(3) definition of employees at the Act's passing in 1935;"1
because supervisors had not traditionally unionized,' z Congress apparently overlooked the need to clarify their status. Unguided by any
clear statement of congressional intent, in 1942 the National Labor Relations Board first took the position that supervisors were employees
within the meaning 13of section 2(3) and thus were entitled to full protection under the Act.
In 1943 the Board reversed itself in Maryland Drydock Co.,14 by
refusing to certify a collective bargaining unit of supervisory employees. Although supervisors were technically employees under the Act
and might benefit from certification as a collective bargaining unit, the
Board stated that this benefit would nevertheless be "outweighed not
only by the dangers inherent in the commingling of management and
employee functions, but also in its possible restrictive effect upon the
11. Section 2(3) of the original Wagner Act provided: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of
any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual
employed by his parent or spouse." National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat.
449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)). However, Congress, even in 1935,
did regard supervisors as employer representatives at least for the purpose of§ 8 unfair labor
practice violations. See To Create a NationalLabor Board-Hearingson S. 2926 Before the
Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 256-57 (1934) (statement of
Otto Beyer), reprintedin 1 LEGIS. HIST. NLRA, supra note 8, at 256-57.
12. Supervisors did have a history of unionization in a few specialized industries such
as the building, printing, maritime, and railroad industries. S. MIN. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1947), reprintedin STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, SENATE
COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93RD CONG., 20 SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 502 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter
cited as LEGIS. HIST. LMRA].
13. In Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942), the Board first unequivocally
held that supervisors were § 2(3) employees, though earlier Board decisions foreshadowed
this 1942 ruling. See International Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 384 (1936); General
Motors Corp., 36 N.L.R.B. 439 (1941).
14. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943). The Board's quick turnaround in MarylandDrydock has
been attributed to a change in its personnel. See C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 347
(2d rev. ed. 1958).
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organizational freedom of rank and file employees."' 5
Two years later the Board experienced a change of heart and reversed itself again, in PackardMotor Car Co.' 6 Deterioration of the
supervisors' traditional independence and managerial responsibilities,
and a correspondingly increased need and desire for collective action
were cited by the Board as justification for its about face.1 7 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision, noting that supervisors
were clearly employees within the NLRA's common-sense definition of
that term, and that it was "for Congress, not for us, to create exceptions
or qualifications at odds with [the Act's] plain terms."' 8
Congress accepted this challenge and overruled Packard within
the year.' 9 The decision, nonetheless, left its historical imprint in the
form of Justice Douglas' oft-quoted dissent. The majority's holding, he
wrote, "tends to obliterate the line between management and labor" to
increase the possibility that "management and labor will become more
of a solid phalanx than separatefactionsin warringcamps."20 A strictly
adversarial perception of the relationship between labor and management, so clearly illustrated by Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, was
a founding premise of the Wagner Act and has survived to the present
in many of the Board's section 8(a)(2) employer domination21 and section 2(5) bona fide labor organization cases discussed infra.
The Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA overruled Packard
and vindicated Justice Douglas by excluding supervisors from the section 2(3) definition of employee. 22 Though the House Report shows
that Congress considered the need to protect employees from domination and control by their supervisors, 23 the primary purpose of the exclusion was to "protect the rights of employers [to have] loyal
representatives in the plants." 24 The exclusion of supervisors was thus
consistent with the thrust of the Taft-Hartley amendments, which was
to redress a perceived imbalance in collective bargaining power created
15. 49 N.L.R.B. at 740.
16. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945), afj'd,330 U.S. 485 (1947). A similar change in Board personnel has been advanced to explain the Board's contradictory rulings. C. GREGORY, LABOR
AND THE LAW 374 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
17. 61 N.L.R.B. at 12-14.
18. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490 (1947).
19. See notes 22-26 & accompanying text infra.
20. 330 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
21. For discussion of the adversary model of labor relations, see Note, New Standards
forDominationandSupportunder Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE L. J. 510 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as New Standards].
22. See note 2 supra.
23. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1947), reprinted in LEGIS. HiST.
LMRA, supra note 12, at 305.
24. Id. at 305-08.
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by the pro-labor Wagner Act. 25 The exclusion of supervisors may be

viewed as congressional acceptance of management's fear that if supervisors were allowed to unionize, 26they might come under the influence
the rank and file.

and control of

Thus by 1947, supervisors had finally been defined by Congress
not as employees, but as management representatives for the purposes
of national labor policy. 27 Section 14(a) was inserted to clarify the supervisor's unprotected status under the Act.2 8 Under its operation, an

employer may discharge a supervisor for either membership or participation in a union, thereby giving the employer power to avoid possible

conflicts of interest raised by its supervisors' union affilations. The
Supreme Court recently confirmed that section 14(a) is the sole legislative response to such employer fears. 2 9 The Court emphasized that
of
Congress had neither intended nor provided for any employer right
30

action against a union for admitting a supervisor to membership.
The Development of Section 8(a)(2)

The NLRA was enacted in the midst of the depression years to
promote, inter alia, the growth of strong labor unions with collective
bargaining power sufficient to raise wages and labor standards and capable of strengthening the severely deflated economy. 3 1 Congress real25. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST.
LMRA, supra note 12, at 408; Developments in the Law--The Taft-HartleyAct, 64 HARv. L.
REv. 781 (1951).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15, reprintedin LEGIS. HiST.
LMRA, supra note 12, at 304-08; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5, reprintedin
LEGIS. HIST. LMRA, supra note 12, at 409-11.
27. See note 26 supra.
28. See note 2 supra.
29. Florida Power and Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
30. The Court characterized Congress's solution as "one of providing the employer
with an option. On the one hand, he is at liberty to demand absolute loyalty from his supervisory personnel by insisting, on pain of discharge, that they neither participate in, nor retain
Alternatively, an employer who wishes to do so can
membership in, a labor union ....
permit his supervisors to join or retain their membership in labor unions, resolving such
conflicts as arise through the traditional procedures of collective bargaining." Id. at 812-13
(footnote omitted).
In FloridaPower and Light, the employer had filed § 8(b)(1)(B) unfair labor practice
charges against the union after the union had disciplined the employer's supervisors for
crossing picket lines during a strike and performing rank and file work. The Supreme Court
refused to uphold the charge, concluding that the unfair labor practice machinery of §
8(b)(1)(B) was not "any part of the solution to the generalized problem of supervisor-member conflicts of loyalties." Id. at 814. See text accompanying notes 140-44 infra.
31. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4, reprintedin2 LEGIS. HiST. NLRA, supra
note 8, at 2302-03; C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 343 (2d rev. ed. 1958). Ultimately
the encouragement of a strong independent labor movement was regarded by Congress as
the vital element of the Wagner Act's prime objective of promoting industrial peace.
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ized the importance of providing employees and unions with a strong,
explicit "bill of rights" to effectuate this purpose. Section 7, which
states in essential part, "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
32
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining,"
was drafted to provide these basic protections.

Congress was also aware of the growing trend toward company
unionism, 33 which Congress regarded as antithetical to a vigorous, independent labor movement. 34 Section 8 was fashioned as a complementary provision to section 7, a specific enforcer of the section 7 rights
guaranteed to employees. In particular, section 8(a)(2) 35 was drafted to
curb the threat posed by employer-dominated company unions to employees' section 7 rights to bargain "through representatives of their
own choosing." Section 8(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to dominate or interfere
with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . .,36
Congress tolerated
if
it
resulted from an
even the ill-regarded company union,
however,
37

exercise of employee free choice.
Sensitized to the rampant problem of company unionism and at-

tempting to maintain a labor environment free of employer involve32. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
33. Note that "company unions" as described by the NLRA's author, Senator Wagner,
refers to "the sham or dummy union which is dominated by the employer, which is supported by the employer, which cannot change its rules or regulations without his consent,
and which cannot live except by the grace of the employer's whims." Senator Wagner's
introductory remarks on the NLRA, reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED

STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION 279 (R. Koretz ed. 1970). The Act did not seek to prohibit
the formation of a company union, "confined by [the workers'] own volition to the boundaries of a particular plant." H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1935), reprintedin 2
LEGIS. HIST. NLRA, supra note 8, at 2971 (emphasis added).
34. H.R. REP. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1935), reprintedin 2 LEGIS. HIST.
NLRA, supra note 8, at 2925; See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (Senator Wagner's introductory remarks on S. 2926), reprintedin LEGIS. HIsT. NLRA, supra note 8, at 15-16.
35. National Labor Relations Act § 8(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). Section 8(2)
became § 8(a)(2) after the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act. See note I supra.
36. Section 8(a)(2) concludes with the proviso: "Provided, [tihat subject to rules and
regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to [§ 6], an employer shall not be
prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss
of time or pay." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
37. "Nothing in the bill prohibits the formation of a company union, if by that term is
meant an organization of workers confined by their own volition to the boundaries of a
particular plant or employer. What is intended is to make such organization the free choice
of the workers, and not a choice dictated by forms of interference which are weighty precisely because of the existence of the employer-employee relationship." H.R. REP. No. 972,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1935), reprintedin 2 LEGIS. HIST. NLRA, supranote 8, at 297172.
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ment, the Board enforced section 8(a)(2) zealously. The Board's stance
reflected both the prevalency of company unionism in the early years
of the NLRA 38 and an underlying belief that there was an inherent
conflict of interest between employers and employees which necessitated strict separation of the two camps. 3 9 To police this separation, the
Board applied section 8(a)(2) strictly, utilizing what one commentator
has referred to as a per se standard.4° Although such strict enforcement
was appropriate to the severity of the problem then posed to employee
free choice by company unionism, the Board's enforcement program
gradually cemented into a paternalistic posture toward the employees
whose free choice it had been designed to protect. Once it found a
certain degree of potential management influence in union affairs, the
Board presumed that employee free choice was incapable of effectuaof
tion. The Board took this tack even when there was no evidence
4
actual employer interference with employee independence. '
In NLRB v. Newport News Shiobuilding & Dry Dock Co.,42 the
Board ordered disestablishment of an employee committee which required agreement of the employer for its effectiveness and gave management veto power over proposed amendments to the committee's
operation. There was no evidence that the employer had, in fact,
abused its power in the committee to interfere with or dominate its
functioning. The Board and the Supreme Court, in affirming, relied
upon the clear potential for domination and invoked the per se standard. Neither the Board nor the Court considered relevant that the
committee had operated for several years to the employees' satisfaction
and that the employees had by4 3referendum overwhelmingly signified
their desire for its continuance.
38. New Standards,supra note 21, at 514, states that in 1935, the year of the NLRA's
enactment, employer-dominated labor organizations such as the "Employee Representation
Plans" fostered by the defunct National Industrial Recovery Act accounted for over
2,500,000 workers." (citing C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR LAW 419, 420 (1968)).
39. Id. at 515, discussing the adversary model.
40. Id. at 511. The Note's author posits: "Any employer support of a labor organization is illegal beyond a certain critical level, regardless of the character of the challenged
organization, the intent of the employer, or the will of the employees. Under this per se rule,
virtually the only question ever litigated is whether the challenged actions are sufficient to
constitute the illegal quantum of support." Id. at 511-12 (footnotes omitted).
For convenience, this Note adopts the term "per se" to refer to the Board's rather
mechanical finding of employer domination under § 8(a)(2). The reader should note, however, that the Board has never labelled as per se the standard it applies in adjudicating §
8(a)(2) charges.
41. As discussed more fully at text accompanying notes 137-57 infra, the authors of this
Note believe that actual evidence of employer domination should be required to substantiate
§ 8(aX2) and § 2(2)(5) bona fide labor organization charges.
42. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
43. Id. at 248, 251.
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In NLRB v. Brown Paper Mill Co.,44 the employee association
members testified that they were not dominated or coerced by the employer and desired representation by the association. In addition, the
Board found no evidence that the employer dominated the association.
Still, the Board, finding that the employer had supported formation of
the association, ordered its disestablishment.45
The Newport News and Brown PaperMill decisions can probably
best be attributed to the Board's commitment to purge the labor movement of company unions, which it viewed as the mandate of section
8(a)(2). Yet the effect of the decisions was to overturn the employees'
exercise of free choice, absent any showing of actual harm to employees, on evidence indicating at most the potential for employer
domination.

Supervisors and Section 8(a)(2)
Although the status of supervisors under the Act .was unsettled
prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Board consistently viewed
them as management representatives for section 8(a)(2) unfair labor
practice purposes. Supervisors' solicitation of union membership, 46
participation on union negotiating committees, 47 holding union offices48 or "spying" on union meetings 49 were regarded by the Board as
50
evidence of employer domination.
Evidence of the employer's actual interference with union activities through its supervisors was usually apparent in these cases which
frequently involved an employer's efforts to block an outside union's
organizing efforts. 5 ' However, the Board never demanded as a formal
prerequisite to a successful section 8(a)(2) charge that a party show actual interference with the employees' section 7 rights. 52 Nevertheless,
44. 108 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1940).
45. Id. at 871.
46. NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 61 (2nd Cir.), modfied, 309 U.S. 629 (1939).
47. Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc., 27 N.L.R.B. 757 (1940).
48. S. Blechman & Sons, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. 15 (1937).
49. Atlas Underwear Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1941).
50. Supervisory membership, alone, in a union, both during and after the Taft-Hartley
amendments, has not been viewed as an employer unfair labor practice. See Ward Bakery
Co., 8 N.L.R1B. 558, 561 (1938).
51. See, e.g., NLRB v. Security Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 136 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.
1943) (employer's supervisors formed company union and threatened to discriminate against
employees in hire and tenure if latter did not join); Atlas Powder Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 912
(1939) (supervisory employees attended union organizational meeting held outside plant
gate and ridiculed union organizer); In re Newberry Lumber & Chemical Co., 17 N.L.R.B.
795 (1939), mod/fied, 123 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1941) (foreman and a son of a foreman who had
led anti-union activities were officers of inside union).
52. See American Enka Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1941); Alaska Salmon
Indus., Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 185 (1948).
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these early cases were correctly decided; the intent and effect of the

employer's action was to restrict its employees' section 7 right to join
and participate in a labor organization of their own choosing. Therefore the Board's use of the per se standard, which was invoked on a

showing ofpotential employer domination through its supervisors, did
not compromise employee free choice as it would in subsequent
decisions.
By the early 1950's, large affiliated unions had grown dramatically
in number and strength.5 3 Company unions, on the other hand, no
longer posed a serious threat to a viable labor movement.5 4 The Board,

nevertheless, continued to apply a per se rule of domination, in particular equating supervisory involvement in union affairs with employer
domination.
In Nassau & Suffolk Contractors'Association, Inc.,55 the Board
found that the service of a supervisor on the union's negotiating committee constituted per se employer interference 56 under section 8(a)(2).
No showing that the supervisor actually injured the employees' inter53.

For a detailed summary of labor union expansion during the 1935-47 period, see P.

TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 398-590 (1964).

54. See Matters Relating to Labor-ManagementRelations Act of 1947: Hearingson H.
Res. 115 Before the House Comm. on EducationandLabor,83rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 266
(1953) (testimony of former Board Chairman Herzog).
55. 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957).
56. Beginning with Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (1948), the Board has distinguished between employer domination of, and employer interference with, a labor union.
Domination is the more severe of these § 8(a)(2) unfair labor practices, found typically when
the employer instigates (as through its supervisors) or directly participates in the organization of the union. Domination, in this sense, is akin to control. Interference will be found
when the employer's relationship to the union falls short of control, but the employer nevertheless exercises a degree of influence upon union policy.
Although "[t]here appears to be no clear and administrable distinction between domination and interference with a labor organization,. . . the major practical significance of
the distinction between domination and interference is the issuance, respectively, of either a
disestablishment order or merely an order to withdraw recognition pending an election and
certification." R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 198-99 (1976).

The Board in Nassau determined that since the employer was not responsible for the
appointments of its supervisors to the union negotiating committee, it could not be considered to be dominating the union. Yet the Board found that the employer's acquiescence to
these appointments constituted employer interference with the union. 118 N.L.R.B. at 18587.
The lesser § 8(a)(2) charge of employer interference with a labor union has been frequently alleged and proven when an employer allows its supervisors to participate in union
affairs. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BAR-

GAINING 199 (1976). Since a major premise of this Note is that mere supervisory participa-

tion in employee unions, with majority employee consent, is unobjectionable, the Note
recommends that this use of the interference charge be abandoned, and that employer domination be the required standard.

January 1979]

SUPERVISORY DOMINATION

ests through its participation in union affairs was required by the Board
in Nassau or in the cases following the Nassau rule.57 Nor has the
Board discussed the possible conflict of its rulings with the employees'

right to freely choose their labor organization. Although the Board
stated in Nassau that "the test, whether a challenged organization is
employer controlled, is not an objective one but rather subjective, from

the standpoint of employees,"5 8 the Board has in practice substituted its

own judgment for that of the employees. Under the per se rule, an
employee's opinion as to employer domination is superfluous. If the
Board finds the requisite degree of supervisory participation in union
affairs, the per se rule stamps it as a section 8(a)(2) violation. The
determines that the employees are
Board, rather than the employees,
59

interfered with or dominated.

Renewed Emphasis Upon Employee Free Choice
Even as the Board was refining its per se rule of domination in the
1940's and 50's, there was rebellion against it in the circuit courts. Several courts appreciated that only by requiring actual evidence of domination could 60
the section 7 policy of guaranteeing employees free choice
be respected.
The Fifth Circuit, in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. NLRB 6 1 noted,

"[T]he Board is not made either guardian or ruler over the employees,
but is only empowered to deliver them from restraint at the hands of

the employer when it exists."' 62 Commenting on the employees' choice
of an inside committee system in lieu of an outside union in Coppus
57. See, eg., Banner Yarn Dyeing Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1962); Geilich Tanning
Cb., 128 N.L.R.B. 501 (1960); Detroit Ass'n of Plumbing Contractors, 126 N.L.R.B. 1381
(1960) mod/imed, 287 F.2d 354 (D.C.Cir. 1961); Alaska Businessmen's Ass'n, 124 N.L.R.B.
662 (1959).
58. 118 N.L.R.B. at 185 (quoting NLRB v. Thompson Prod., Inc., 130 F.2d 363, 368
(6th Cir. 1942)). This is the test of employer domination followed in Nassau and should be
distinguished from the Nassau test of employer interference. See note 56 supra.
59. In Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
although there was testimony of one employee's subjective feeling that he was dominated,
the circuit court utilized the per se rule to determine that the employer had illegally interfered with the union. The court determined that because the employer allowed supervisory
participation in the union beyond mere membership, it was guilty of interference. The rigidity of this per se standard is underlined by the fact that in the Journeymen case, it was the
unanimous view of all the parties that "the supervisors, in their intra-union activities, at all
times acted in what they considered in complete good faith to be the best interests of the
union." Id. at 360.
60. These early cases did not concern supervisory participation but other forms of alleged employer interference or domination. See New Standards,supra note 21, for a comprehensive analysis of this trend.
61. 113 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1940).
62. Id. at 88.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

Engineering Corp. v. NLRB, 63 Judge Magruder recognized that "[The]
choice was theirs, and the Act guarantees to them freedom to exercise

that choice unimpeded by employer interference or coercion." 64 Because "the evidence show[ed] no more than cooperation by petitioner
and a possibility of company control" 65 and "there [was] no actual
evidence of domination of the Committee by petitioner, '66 the Court
refused to find a section 8(a)(2) violation.
Cases in which the courts have demanded a showing of actual

domination typically involve factual circumstances similar to that in
Coppus Engineering. A rival union defeated in its bid to represent employees files section 8(a)(2) charges against the employer for either sug-

67
gesting, participating in, or giving support to an employee committee.

In one of the earliest of these cases, 68 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
"indicia of domination, ' 69 which to the Board signified domination of
the employees by the company. The court wrote:
These acts do no more than evidence the presence of potential means
for interference and support, a possibility that is always present to
some degree in an employer-employee relationship. But, without evidence of the realization of that potential, they do not furnish a substantial factual basis for an unfair labor practice finding. 70 [Actual
domination must be shown before a violation is established. 7
Similarly, in Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,7 2 the Sixth Circuit
overruled the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(2) violation because

there was no evidence of an antiunion bias by the employer or any
employee dissatisfaction with the employee committee representing
them. 73 Later court cases such as Federal-MogulCorp. v. NLRB 74 and
63. 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957).
64. Id. at 573 (Magruder, C.J., concurring). Judge Magruder continues, "mhe statute
does not make it the duty of the employer, nor a function of the Board, to 'baby' along the
employees in the direction of choosing an outside union as their bargaining representative."
Id. at 574.
65. Id. at 573.
66. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
67. Common types of support cited are the employer's allowing use of company time or
company property for employee committee meetings, Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d
281 (5th Cir. 1958) (company time); McCulloch Motors Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1709 (1958)
(company facilites); regular pay for time spent in meetings, Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260
F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Summers Fertilizer Co., 251 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1958);
Standard Transformer Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 669 (1951); General Molds & Plastics Corp., 122
N.L.R.B. 287 (1958); or the employer paying for refreshments consumed at employee committee meetings.
68. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
69. Id. at 170.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 168 (emphasis in original).
72. 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
73. The court cautioned that evidence of employer domination should be "carefully
scrutinized" when presented by an outside union seeking to assume the incumbent organiza-
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NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc. 75 have also refused to apply the Boardcreated per se domination standard, requiring instead evidence of actual employer domination of union activities.
The Ninth Circuit decided the most significant of the recent series
of cases in which courts have refused to adopt the Board's per se standard in favor of the employees' right to choose the type and composition of their collective bargaining representative. In Hertzka & Knowles
76
V. NLB,
professional architectural employees voted to decertify an
outside union, and, with management support, substituted five inhouse bargaining committees, each composed of one management representative and four employees. The decertified union filed section
8(a)(2) charges against the employer alleging, inter alia, that the presence of management representatives on the committees constituted employer domination of the labor organization. Emphasizing that the
employees had exercised free choice in selecting the committee system
and that no evidence of employer domination of the committees was
shown, the Ninth Circuit declined to uphold the Board's section 8(a)(2)
finding. The court stressed that proper evaluation of section 8(a)(2)
charges must include consideration of that provision's original purpose
and function within the framework of the NLRA:
Central to the National Labor Relations Act is the facilitation of employee free choice and employee self-organization. Indeed, § 8(a)(2)
is, in part, a means to that end, for it seeks to permit employees to
freely assert their demands for improvements in working conditions.
Literally, however, almost any form of employer cooperation, however innocuous, could be deemed "support" or "interference." Yet
such a myopic view of § 8(a)(2) would undermine its very purpose
and the purpose of the Act as a whole-fostering free
choice-because it might prevent the establishment of a system the
employees desired. Thus the literal prohibition of § 8(a)(2)
must be
tempered by recognition of the objectives of the NLRA.77
The decision in Hertzka reflects judicial awareness of changing
realities. Epployer proximity to unions does not imply the same threat
to employee free choice that it once did. The Board's knee-jerk response to employer contact with unions, once appropriate, may now
don's duties. The court concluded, however, that "[t]o permit the Board to abort this [employer-employee] relationship because an outside union wants to take over, in the face of
lack of substantial evidence of domination, would be a disservice to the Act, as well as to the
employees which [sic] the Act seeks to protect." Id. at 204-05.
74. 394 F.2d 915 (6th Cir. 1968). The court emphasized, "It is not the potential for
control that the Act declares unlawful but the actual domination of a labor organization and
employer interference with employee freedom of choice." Id. at 918; accord, Lake City
Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 1162, 1174 (7th Cir. 1970).
75. 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1968).
76. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
77. Id. at 629-30.
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itself interfere with employee free choice. This Note concurs with those
who have argued persuasively for the abandonment of the per se rule

in section 8(a)(2) cases. 78 The emerging circuit court practice of analyzing each set of facts to discover whether the indicia of potential

domination present are reinforced by evidence of actual employer
domination, or whether the employees themselves assert employer interference with their union activities, provides a more reliable test of

employer domination.
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, the per se rule of

domination must also be reexamined in its other applications. It has
been extended to allegations of supervisory domination, and the dan-

ger, as with a section 8(a)(2) charge, is that by applying the per se rule,
the Board fails to ask whether that rule serves its primary purpose--to
effectuate employees' section 7 rights.

Supervisory Domination and the Bona Fide Labor Organization
Shortly after passage of the Wagner Act, the Board was asked to
examine section 8(a)(2)'s policy against employer domination, but in a
different context from the usual section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice
charge. At a representation hearing,7 9 prior to certification of the labor
78. See New Standards,supra note 21, for a thorough and persuasive refutation of the §
8(a)(2) per se standard.
79. This hearing is generally termed a representation proceeding, because it is convened by the Board to determine whether "a question of representation affecting commerce
exists" within the meaning of National Labor Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)
(1976). The procedure of this section is invoked when a petition is filed for a representation
election, either by employees, a union acting in their behalf or by the employer itself. If 30%
of the employees have authorized the union's petition and if the industry in question affects
interstate commerce, the Board conducts a representation hearing and secret-ballot election.
R. GORMAN, BASIC TExT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
40-41 (1976).
As a practical matter, representation hearings have become a forum for attacks upon
the capacity of petitioning organizations to serve as collective bargaining representatives of
the employees. Most frequently at issue is whether the petitioning organization meets the
definition of "labor organization" in NLRA § 2(5). The Board has utilized the representation hearing to enforce the policy against supervisory domination, finding that unions "dominated" by supervisors are not "bona fide" labor organizations. See note 7, supra.
Section 2(5)'s definition of labor organization has been the focus of other scrutiny at
representation hearings. Recent examples include: St. Clare's Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 158
(1977), in which the Board reaffirmed its holding in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223
N.L.R.B. 251 (1976), that hospital interns, residents and housestaff were "primarily students" rather than employees and therefore the petitioner was not a "labor organization";
International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots of America, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1172
(1963), affid, 351 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in which an organization composed of approximately 11,000 members but only 170 employees within the meaning of § 2(3) was charged
with a violation of § 8(b)(4)(A) which prohibits secondary boycotts as an unfair labor practice. The organization claimed that it was not a labor organization within § 2(5) and there-
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organization as collective bargaining representative of a company's employees, contentions were raised that, because the employer, or in later
cases, its supervisors were involved in the petitioning labor organization's affairs, the organization was employer dominated 80
and therefore
incapable of arn's length bargaining with the employer.
In these early representation cases in which employer domination
was alleged, the Board's actions paralleled its treatment of the issue in
formal section 8(a)(2) proceedings. If an employer or its supervisor
were shown to have been involved in the formation or support of the
petitioning organization, the Board applied its per se rule of employer
domination and refused to certify the labor organization as collective
bargaining representative. In Phelps Dodge Corporation, United Verde
Branch,81 and DouglasAircraftCompany, Inc.,8 2 employee associations
were among the labor organizations seeking certification. In each case
the Board denied the employee association a place on the ballot in the
representation election because it lacked status as a bona fide labor
organization.
In Phelps Dodge, employee committees had been established by
joint management-employee efforts, and could be terminated unilaterally by the management's board of directors.83 Although the Board
made an initial determination that the employee committees were labor
organizations within the meaning of section 2(5) of the NLRA, it would
not consider them bona fide representatives of the employees because
of "the complete subjection of the organization to the employer." 84
fore could not be held to answer under the NLRA. The Board, on remand from the D.C.
Circuit, held otherwise, applying the test of whether the organization included employees
"in a substantial number and proportion" and whether employees participated "in a substantial and meaningful manner." Id. at 1176-77.
The difference in interpretation of§ 2(5) in InternationalOrganizationand Marriott InFlite Servs. v. Local 504, Air Transport Div., 557 F.2d 295 (2nd Cir. 1977), which was decided along similar lines, and the cases concerning supervisory domination and "bona fide
labor organizations," appears to arise because of different policies sought to be protected. In
InternationalOrganizationand MarriottIn-lite Services it was necessary to find that the
organizations met § 2(5) requirements in order to bring them within the Act's prohibition
against secondary boycotts. In the supervisory domination cases, employers attempt to use §
2(5) as an exclusionary device, to deny certification to unions on grounds of alleged incapacity to represent employees in good faith. Hence, a different approach, and different tests,
were applied toward a determination of what constitutes a labor organization within the
meaning of § 2(5).
80. See notes 46-50 & accompanying text supra concerning the Board's determination
that supervisors were management representatives for purposes of § 8(a)(2); this determination has also been applied to allegations of employer domination at union representation
hearings. See notes 1-9 & accompanying text supra; notes 81-87 & accompanying text infra.
81. 6 N.L.R.B. 624 (1938).
82. 53 N.L.R.B. 486 (1943).
83. 6 N.L.R.B. at 629.
84. Id. at 630.
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The Board deemed such subservience to be contrary to "the fundamen-

tal purposes of the Act," and found it rendered the organization "pa'85
tently incapable of bargaining at arm's length with the employer.

In DouglasAircraft,rival unions contended that an employee association was not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.

Hearing testimony that the association had been conceived and organized by an executive of the company, the Board found it incapable of
of the employees for the purposes
serving as a bona fide representative
86
of collective bargaining.
Although the procedural posture of Phelps Dodge and Douglas
Aircraft differed from that followed in a section 8(a)(2) charge,8 7 the

policy sought to be implemented was the same-to protect employees

from company unionism. In Rochester andPittsburgh CoalCo., 88 however, it was the employer who refused to recognize an organization
composed predominantly of its own supervisors, and at the representation hearing contended that control of the union by supervisors ren-

dered the labor organization incapable of good faith representation of
nonsupervisory employees. 89 Noting that the supervisors "[b]y their

numbers. .. necessarily control the Union's policies and practices,"'9

and had "repeatedly brought pressure upon subordinate employees to
join,"91 the Board refused the organization a place on the representa-

tion ballot.
In retrospect, Rochester is identifiable as one of the few Board de85. Id.
86. 53 N.L.R.B. at 489. See Toledo Stamping & Mfg. Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 865, 868 (1944),
in which supervisors' participation in the union's organizing drive rendered that union "incapable of serving as the bona fide representative."
87. A "normal" § 8(a)(2) charge is brought by a member of a union, or by a rival
union, alleging that the employer is dominating or interfering with the formation or administration of the union. This is an unfair labor practice charge lodged specifically against the
employer. See text accompanying notes 31-41 supra. For a listing of the innumerable fact
situations which have been found by the Board to constitute § 8(a)(2) violations, see cases
cited in New Standards,supra note 21, at 512 nn. 112-25.
Phelps Dodge and DouglasAircraft, however, did not arrive before the Board as a result
of § 8(a)(2) charges filed against the employer, but instead arose from petitions for certification as collective bargaining representative. In PhelpsDodge the Board itself singled out the
employee committees as dominated and therefore not worthy of certification, while in Douglas Aircraft the rival unions alleged domination of an employee association, with the Board
reaching the same result.
88. 56 N.L.R.B. 1760 (1944).
89. Id. at 1763.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1764. Compelling an employee to join a labor organization is a prima facie
violation of that employee's § 7 rights to join a labor organization. That point was made
explicit by the Taft-Hartley amendments, ch. 120, §§ 101-707, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), to NLRA
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), three years after the Rochester decision: "[Employees] shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities .... ." (emphasis added).
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cisions to detail findings of actual harm to employees' exercise of their
free choice occasioned by supervisory domination, and was, for its
time, unmistakably correctly decided. But the case's historical importance lies primarily in its function as a crossroads, or perhaps a blending, of the original legislative policy against company unionism with a
newer, more pointed focus upon supervisory participation in union
affairs.
The Rochester Board recited the principle against company unionism enunciated in Phelps Dodge, noted its application in Douglas
Aircraft to an organization conceived and organized by an employer's
supervisor, and cited the principle's extension to a supervisor's solicitation of union members in Toledo Stamping & ManufacturingCo. 92 Yet
because it was the employer in Rochester which contested the union's
certification, the Board must have recognized that its decision to refuse
certification could not be premised upon the principle of protecting employees from employer domination, alone. Allowing an employer to
defeat its employees' choice of a union by asserting that it was employer dominated would have been nonsensical. The Board announced broader principles, intended to include protections not only
for employees from company unionism, but also protections for the
employer from "the irreconcilable and conflicting positions in which
such affiliations would place supervisors. ' 93 Henceforth, a petitioning
union need not only be a labor organization within the meaning of
section 2(5) of the Act, but it must also be found capable of dealing at
arms length with the employer in good faith
for the employees it repre94
sents-a "bona fide labor organization."
Contemporaneous with and in some cases precipitated by 95 the To92. 55 N.L.R.B. 865 (1944).
93. 56 N.L.R.B. at 1765. The Board's decision reflected concern for the conflict of
interest potentially raised by an employer's supervisors' participation in union affairs. It
should be noted that this decision was rendered during a decade in which the status of
supervisors under the Act was constantly changing. In the Rochester case the Board cited
Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943), in which it had refused to certify a bargaining unit of supervisors. This case was overruled, after the Rochester decision, in Packard
Motor Car Co., 61 N.L.RB. 421 (1945) and L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 65 N.L.R.B.
298, 303 (1946), to allow supervisors to form their own collective bargaining units. The
question of supervisors' freedom to participate in union affairs was legislatively addressed in
1947 by the Taft-Hartley amendments which denied supervisors protection under the Act.
Supervisors were excluded from the § 2(3) definition of employees and the employer was
given the right to control the union activities of its supervisors by the addition of § 14(a).
See discussion in notes 11-26,28-30 & accompanying text supra;notes 140-44 & accompanying text infra.
94. This precise term first appeared in Columbia Pictures, 94 N.L.R.B. 466, 469 n.20
(1951). Rochester used the term "bona fide (bargaining) representative." See Rochester and
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1760, 1763 (1944).
95. See Charlottesville Woolen Mills, 59 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161 (1944); California Packing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 941 (1944). In CalfforniaPackingthe employer argued "that the peti-
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ledo Stamping and Rochester decisions, other employers defended their
refusal to recognize or bargain with petitioning unions by alleging that
supervisory participation rendered the unions incapable of serving as
bona fide bargaining representatives. 96 The Board began to gauge the
degree of supervisory involvement in union affairs, finding that if it fell
below a certain level, certification of the unit would be proper. Accordingly, mere membership 97 or limited participation 98 in a labor organization was held allowable. On the other hand, where the evidence
indicated significant supervisory involvement in the union, particularly
with respect to its dominant composition,99 leadership,100 or solicitation
of members by supervisors, 10 ' or its grouping of employees and supervisors in the same bargaining unit, 10 2 the union was found to be incapable of good faith representation of regular employees.
By 1951, though lacking a specific statutory directive, the Board
had evolved a "customary rule of disqualification of organizations
dominated by supervisors."' 1 3 The presence of supervisors in the affairs of a union had become in itself a subject of Board scrutiny, severed from its origin of protecting against employer domination.
By the 1970's the divorce of the original rationale behind the supervisory-domination prohibition, from the rule's application in later
cases, was producing anomalous results. Increasingly, employers were
alleging supervisory domination of the union seeking to represent their
workers, even though the employers could prove no harm to
themselves.
The doctrine of supervisory domination is now broadly construed
to address any potential supervisory conflict of interest asserted by any
party to a representation hearing, whether or not the conflict is shown
tion (to certify the union) should be dismissed on the authority of... Toledo Stamping...
and ... Rochester." 59 N.L.R.B. at 942.
96. Comfort Spring Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 980, 981 (1945); Charlottesville Woolen Mills,
59 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1944); California Packing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 941 (1944).
97. Merrimac Mills Co. 63 N.L.R.B. 781, 783 (1945); California Packing Co., 59
N.L.R.B. at 942 (1944).
98. Comfort Spring Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 980, 981 (1945) (one supervisor found to have
signed an authorization card and attended one union meeting). See also Allen B. DuMont
Laboratories, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 1296, 1297 (1950), in which a union member serving as acting president was arguably a supervisor simultaneously, but this fact alone was not held
sufficient to bar the union from the election.
99. Columbia Pictures Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 466, 470 (1951).
100. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 973, 975 (1965); Alaska Salmon Indus.,
Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 185, 188 (1948).
101. Alaska Salmon Indus., Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 185, 188 (1948).
102. Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co. 152 N.L.R.B. 973 (1965); New York City Omnibus
Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 579 (1953).
103. Columbia Pictures Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 466 (1951).
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to impair the protesting party's interests. 10 Factual determinations of
whether a particular degree of supervisory participation constitutes
domination have become such a consuming concern for the Board that
consideration of whether actual harm results from the supervisors involvement is largely forgotten. Overshadowed, too, is the section 7 policy, elemental fuel which sustains the NLRA's drive, guaranteeing
employees the right to select and participate in labor organizations of
their own choosing.
The cases which follow illustrate the consequence of preoccupation with supervisory involvement without sufficient regard given to
actual harm caused to employees' freedom of choice. Collective bargaining stalls in its tracks.
Recent Tests of Supervisory Domination in Nurses
Professional Associations
In July of 1974, Congress amended the NLRA to provide coverage
to formerly excluded employees of private, nonprofit hospitals.10 5
State affiliates of the American Nurses Association were quick to respond, requesting recognition as collective bargaining representatives
for local bargaining units composed of nonsupervisory registered
nurses. Many of these requests for recognition, however, were denied
by hospital-employers in cases which would reach the Board in a
flurry, from 1975-77.106

The procedural history 07 and facts involved in these cases are
104. See text accompanying notes 105-36 infra.
105. Pub. L. No. 93-360 § 1(b), 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (amending 27 U.S.C. § 152 (1974)).
106. See note 4 supra.
107. The procedural history from Sisters of Charity of Providence, St. Ignatius Province,
d/b/a St. Patrick Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 799 (1976) is illustrative: the state nurses' association
filed a § 9(c) petition for election pursuant to which a hearing was held. The Regional
Director of the N.L.R.B. issued a Decision and Direction of Election, finding that petitioner
association.was a labor organization, and directing an election. The employer requested
review, which the Board denied, but added that "in the event the Petitioner is certified and
does not delegate its bargaining to a local autonomous chapter controlled by nonsupervisory
employees, a motion to revoke the certification will be entertained." Id. at 799. Thereafter,
a secret ballot election was held in which petitioner nurses' association received a majority
of votes cast. Petitioner was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative by the Regional Director and requested the employer to bargain. Petitioner filed § 8(a)(5) charges
when the employer refused, but later revoked them. The employer filed a motion to revoke
certification, alleging failure to delegate; the Regional Director referred this motion to the
Board for consideration. The Board remanded to the Regional Director for hearing with
respect to: "(1) a definition, with specificity, of the bargaining process, including what powers, if any, the State Nurses' Association has in determining the composition of the negotiating committee and the authority, if any, of the State Nurses' Association with respect (sic)
approval or disapproval of a final agreement, if one can be reached; (2) the degree of participation, either direct or indirect, of supervisory nurses in the bargaining-process; and (3) such
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substantially similar. At an initial representation hearing or again,
upon orders to bargain, an employer attempts to defeat certification of
the state nurses' association, alleging its domination by supervisors.
The Board makes a threshold determination that the bargaining unit is
composed solely of nonsupervisory nurses, 10 8 and emphasizes that none
of the employer's supervisors are leaders of the state nurses'
association. 19
The issue most closely contested in these cases, however, concerns
the degree of contact between the local bargaining units, composed
solely of nonsupervisory nurses, and the state nurses' association, which
includes supervisors as members and leaders. Though it was the state
nurses' association that was certified in each case as the collective bargaining representative of the petitioning nurses, the Board developed a
policy of requiring delegation of the actual collective bargaining duties
to the local bargaining unit. In theory, this limited the influence that
supervisory nurses in the state association could exert upon the regular
nurses.
The origins of delegation can be traced to the singleminded
thought of Harry A. Millis, Chairman of the NLRB from 1940 to 1945.
In 1943, in his dissent in MrarylandDrydock,"0 and again, in his conother evidence as may be deemed relevant." Id. at 798. Following the hearing, the case was
transferred to the Board's three member panel for filing of briefs by the parties, and the
decision. For an example of a more abbreviated procedural history, see St. Rose de Lima
Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1976).
108. The Board in Nassau & Suffolk Contractors Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174, 181 n.23
(1957), stated that "the Taft-Hartley Act has made mandatory the exclusion of supervisors
from any unit found appropriate by the Board. It does not, however, prohibit employers
and unions from voluntarily including supervisors in bargaining units."
There are many recent cases which determine whether particular types of nurses fall
within the § 2(11) definition of supervisors, an issue tangential to this Note. See St. Rose de
Lima Hosp. Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1976); Valley Hosp. Ltd., 220 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1975);
The Trustees of Noble Hosp., 218 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1975); Bishop Randall Hosp., 217
N.L.R.B. 1129 (1975); Mercy Hosp. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765 (1975); Doctors
Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 611 (1975). See especially Brattleboro Memorial Hosp., Inc., 226
N.L.R.B. 1036 (1976), in which head nurses were found not to be supervisors within § 2(1 1)
and were included within the bargaining unit.
109. Two cases in which this was given special mention are Oak Ridge Hosp., 220
N.L.R.B. 49 (1975), and its predecessor, International Paper Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 933 (1968).
Concern about supervisors in positions of union leadership, though not explained specifically in the nurses line of cases, appears to be a hold-over from § 8(a)(2) cases. Under the
Board's rigorous application of that section, when an employer's supervisors held unionleadership posts it was a clear case of employer domination. See cases cited note 100 supra.
Hence consideration of supervisors' leadership positions is illogical in this context. The employer should not be able to allege its own domination of the union as grounds to deny
certification. If the employer asserts a conflict of interest as to itself, it should exercise its
power to control its supervisors' union activity under § 14(a). See text accompanying notes
140-48 infra.
110. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733, 744 (1943).
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curring opinion in Rochester,"' Millis wrote that he would have allowed unions, though replete with supervisors, to represent
nonsupervisory employees, had "appropriate demarcation lines [been]

observed."1 12 Millis agreed that mere exclusion of supervisors from the

bargaining unit was pro forma separation, and not in itself sufficient.
However, instead of voting to deny certification, Millis suggested the
concept of delegation which the Board ultimately adopted in the

nurses' association cases. Indeed, the standards Millis proposed in
1943 are remarkably similar to those employed by the Board today:
"[Tihe Board may in its discretion require that supervisory and
subordinate groups shall be independent of one another in union meetings, in the formulation of demands upon management, and in the ap-

' 13
proval or disapproval of tentative agreements."
In 1968 the Board cited testimony by a petitioning nurses associa-

tion that "should it be certified, goals and negotiations involving the

unit... would be determined and pursued solely by members of the
unit,"' 1 4 and allowed the certification. Although one of the cases in the

1975-1977 period did not mention delegation,11 5 the requirement that
the state nurses' association effectively delegate collective bargaining
duties to the
local bargaining units has assumed increasing
6
importance.

1

In 1975 the Board decided Annapolis Emergency HospitalAssociation, Inc., d/b/a Anne Arundel GeneralHospital.17 On the whole the

Board treated the facts as it did in Anne Arundel's companion cases,' 18
painstakingly examining the structure of the state nurses' association
and potential for supervisory control of the collective bargaining proc-

111. Rochester and Pittsburgh Coal Co., 56 N.L.RLB. 1760, 1765 (1944).
112. Id.
113. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733,744 (1943) (Millis, chairman, dissenting).
114. International Paper Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 933, 933 (1968). This factor, along with the
Board's finding of "substantial participation by the employee members ... and that no
employer supervisors... are presently serving on The Board of Directors" was found persuasive to refute the employer's contention that the association was not a labor organization.
115. Oak Ridge Hosp., 220 N.L.R.B. 49 (1975).
116. When the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d
524 (4th Cir. 1977), reversed the Board's certification of the Maryland Nurses Association,
Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., d/b/a Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., 217 N.L.R.B. 848
(1975), the majority opinion stated emphatically, "[D]elegation is the principal issue ...
561 F.2d at 539.
117. 217 N.L.R.B. 848 (1975), rev'd,561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977). Following its election
and certification, the Maryland Nurses Association (MNA) brought unfair labor practice
charges against the Hospital under § 8(a)(5), alleging the hospital's failure to bargain in
good faith with MNA. The Board granted a summary judgment on the ground that the
hospital's defense consisted only of issues fully litigated at the certification hearing. This
summary judgment and a cease and desist order against the hospital for refusing to bargain
are recorded at 221 N.L.R.B. 305 (1975).
118. See note 4 supra.
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ess. The MNA was certified as a bona fide labor organization because
the local bargaining unit admitted no supervisors to its membership, no
employer supervisors were officers or directors of the MNA, and bargaining duties had been delegated to the local bargaining unit.
Anne Arundel, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, which in 1977 denied the Board's petition for enforcement. 1 9 The majority decision was based upon two grounds: (1)
that the certification of MNA as the collective bargaining representa-

tive was improper as a matter of law 20 and (2) that the certification

119. NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977). The
case was argued initially before a panel of the court with the late Judge Craven preparing an
opinion in which Judge Hall concurred. Judge Winter dissented. Prior to the filing of the
panel opinions, a motion was made to rehear the case in banc and the motion carried.
Before reargument in banc was heard, Judge Craven died. After reargument in banc, Chief
Judge Haynsworth, and Judges Winter, Butzner, Russell and Widener voted to deny enforcement of the Board's order, adopting Judge Winter's panel opinion as the majority opinion with an additional statement. Judge Hall dissented for the reasons set forth in Judge
Craven's panel opinion. Id. at 526.
120. The majority, per Judge Winter, states, "[I]t is certain that the principal defect
which we perceive in the Board's order is a purely legal one, namely that under the Act the
Board may not certify a bargaining agent on condition that it not bargain." Id. at 528. The
primary basis for the Fourth Circuit's holding, then, is that the method employed by the
Board to obviate even potential supervisory control is legally defective.
The court's opinion is constructed from a building block reading of several defiitions
in the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 159 states that employees select "representatives" for collective
bargaining, and "representative" is defined by 29 U.S.C. § 152(4) to mean "any individual
or labor organization." Section 152(5) decrees that a "labor organization" must exist "for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, ...
wages," etc. The majority reasoned that since the most important function of a labor organization is to carry on collective bargaining, and since the Board's order prohibits MNA from
actual collective bargaining, the Board has not only been logically inconsistent but also violated the Act. Id. at 537.
The court concluded that since MNA was not "willing and able to bargain" it could not
satisfy the § 152(5) definition of a labor organization, and thus could not be certified by the
Board. This Note does not share the court's concern, nor its reading of these defmitions, for
two reasons. MNA was certified by the Board as a labor organization, which under the
statutory definition must exist "in whole or in part" to bargain collectively. The delegation
of collective bargaining responsibilities to its local chapter, Anne Arundel, does not necessitate the conclusion that MNA is no longer a labor organization. MNA is a labor organization of which Anne Arundel is a part. The Board requires that the process of collective
bargaining be delegated to Anne Arundel chapter to remove collective bargaining to that
part of the labor organization free of any potential supervisory influence. Part of the labor
organization, then, is conducting the collective bargaining so delegation does not deprive
MNA of its identity as a labor organization.
The courts should be wary of a misleadingly literal reading of the statute that would
defeat the purposes of the Act. The Second Circuit recently reminded the legal community
that literal reading of statutes can produce the wrong result. In Marriott In-Flite Servs. v.
Local 504, Air Transport Div., 557 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1977), the literal definitions of "employee," "employer," and "labor organization" clearly supported the federal district court's
finding that a union organized under the Railway Labor Act was not a "labor organization"
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was improper as a matter of fact. The latter half of the holding reflects
nothing more than clear disagreement with the Board's factual finding
that MNA had effectively delegated collective bargaining responsibility
to the local bargaining unit. The local unit,12 1 in the opinion of the
Appellate Court, was not free of supervisory domination.
Stripped to its elementary form the issue as framed by both the
Board and court became a question of degree. How much contact with,

and influence over the local bargaining unit would be required to support a finding of supervisory domination.1 22 Contact which the Board
and thus was free to engage in secondary boycotts forbidden to a N.L.R.A. union. Id. at
297. The Second Circuit reversed the district court by rejecting the literal meaning in favor
of effectuating the legislative intent. The court cited Judge Friendly's decision in J.C. Penney Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1962), in which he summarized the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543
(1940): "When the 'plain meaning' of statutory language 'has led to absurd or futile results,'
the Supreme Court 'has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act'; 'even when the
plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at
variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,"' the Court 'has followed that purpose
rather than the literal words."' 557 F.2d at 298.
The Board's delegation device is uniquely designed to accommodate two primary policies of the NLRA. It is intended to insulate the collective bargaining process from supervisory influence, thus deflecting any possible conflicts of interest which might interfere with
the right of employees to be representated by a labor organization capable of "singleminded pursuit of the welfare'of the bargaining unit." NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency
Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 1977) (Craven, J., dissenting). Equally importantly,
delegation is designed in light of the Board's current policy of safeguarding against potential
domination, to ensure that employees-can exercise their right to choose their own representative, a right reflected in virtually every section of the NLRA and tempered only by conflicts
of interest discussed above.
This is neither new nor unsettled ground for the Board. Delegation to avoid potential
conflict of interest has at least a 35-year history, see Maryland Drydock, 49 N.L.R.B. 733,
744 (1943), and the Board has much experience with certification questions concerning employees' freedom to choose between international unions and their locals. See New Castle
Prod., Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 811 (1952); Lane Wells Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 252 (1948). In sum, delegation appears to be a tool well chosen to accommodate both the employees' right to select
their own bargaining representative, and the Board's present policy that they be free of even
potential conflicts of interest in the collective bargaining process.
Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the delegation device to accomplish the Board's
present policy of avoiding even potential supervisory domination, the authors of this Note
respectfully propose that the policy itself be changed, and the need for delegation left to the
employees' judgment. Separating supervisors and rank and file employees should be left to
the decisions of the employer, through its § 14(a) remedy, and to employees, who by voting
for a bargaining representative can elect to exclude supervisors, or can file a § 8(a)(2) charge
if the employer, through its supervisors, is dominating the union. See text accompanying
notes 137-38 infra.
121. The unit's official designation is "The Registered Nurses of Anne Arundel General
Hospital, Professional Chapter of the Maryland Nurses Association, Inc." 561 F.2d at 529.
122. The Board had phrased, then answered the issue in similar terms in Sisters of Charity of Providence, St. Ignatius Province, d/b/a St. Patrick Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 799, 801
(1976). Reviewing evidence that the Montana Nurses' Association received dues from local
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appraised as
had labelled "advisory and technical in nature" the court
123

showing "continuing and ultimate control by MNA."'

In Sierra Vista Hospital,Inc., 124 a case involving the California
Nurses Association (CNA), the Board characterized the Economic and
General Welfare Program (EGW) as "a separate arm,"1 25 akin to a
buffer between the CNA and the local bargaining unit. But the EGW
was considered by the Fourth Circuit in Anne Arundel to illustrate the

Maryland Nurses Association's direct participation in the collective
bargaining process. The court recited the same facts passed over by the
Board in AnneArundel and other nurses' association cases 26 but interpreted them to be demonstrative of MNA's impermissible degree of
influence over collective bargaining. 27 The court also stressed
"MNA's principal instrument of control . . . the power of the
purse." 28 All dues are submitted directly to the American Nurses Association, remitted to MNA, then apportioned to the local bargaining

units. The local units must make budget requests before the Council
on Professional Employment Activities, which are then subject to further approval by the MNA Board of Directors. "Certainly," the court
concluded, "MNA dominates [Anne Arundel] bargaining and griev.bargaining unit members and executed any collective bargaining agreement entered into by
the local unit, the Board stated: "It does not establish that MNA has such control over the
bargaining process as to require revocation of the certification." (emphasis added) The
degree of influence then, is a factual determination upon which a finding of supervisory
domination hinges. Implicitly, the Board accepts some degree of contact and influence. The
Fourth Circuit disagreed that the degree exhibited in Anne Arundel was a permissible
amount.
123. 561 F.2d at 538.
124. 225 N.L.R.B. 1086 (1976).
125. The Economic and General Welfare Program is an office of the state nurses' association which aids local bargaining units in formulating their collective bargaining goals. The
Board in Sierra Vilta determined the function of the EGW to be "advisary and technical in
nature" and that it would not "infringe upon or diminish a unit's control over local bargaining matters." Further, the Board found that the EGW operated "as a separate arm of the
CNA, free of any real or potential control by the latter's Board of Directors." Id. at 1087.
126. Such facts included the EGW's furnishing advice on bargaining goals and strategies, supplying contract language and utilizing its staff negotiator in the collective bargaining. 561 F.2d at 538-39.
127. The circuit court cited a significant fact which had been overlooked by the Board in
Anne Arundel and which was not present in the Board's other nurses' association cases. The
MNA Board of Directors had established no-strike and no-union security agreement rules
binding upon all local bargaining units. The court correctly cited this as an instance of
MNA control over the autonomy of the local bargaining units. The court also mentioned
that the District level of the MNA retained power to discipline nurses, including the authority to expel nurses from membership for such things as violating the no-strike provision.
"Such power," the court remarked, "can easily be utilized to influence bargaining decisions
and bring about results thought to be appropriate by MNA." Id. at 539.
128. Id. at 538.
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ance procedures through fiscal control." 129
Thus, despite the Maryland Nurses' Association's earnest attempts
to insulate its collective bargaining activities from any possible infection of supervisory influence, the Fourth Circuit found the potential for
such conflict existed. Such a narrow focus uponpotential control is an
unsatisfactory method for policing against harm allegedly caused by
supervisory involvement in union affairs. The potential for supervisory
influence and domination exists, albeit attenuated, when a labor organization's membership includes even one supervisor.
It is not difficult to understand how the Board and Fourth Circuit
could draw different conclusions concerning the potential for supervisory domination of the bargaining unit in Anne Arundel. Both Board
and court, by examining the potential for supervisory domination, remained mired in murky judgment calls which have confounded courts,
Congress, and the Board for over forty years.
In their dual role as employees but also managers of subordinate
employees, supervisors do indeed wear two hats.1 30 In the 1940's the
Board treated supervisors gingerly, if not confusedly, twice reversing its
position in a caroming series of cases1 31 which stand primarily for the
difficulty of the question: Does supervisorial status presuppose an inherent conflict of interest? Congress answered the question in the affirmative, apparently heeding Jesus' caution that no man can serve two
masters. 132
Management's lobby at the time of the Taft-Hartley amendments
was particularly strong;1 33 employers' fear that union affiliations would
promote disloyalty among their supervisors was communicated to Congress, which then moved to resolve the question. Henceforth, supervisors would be considered management representatives. They were to
have no rights as employees under the NLRA, giving management stat1 34 Of
utory power to curb the union activities of their supervisors.
129. Id.
130. For a good illustration of the "two hat" dilemma of the supervisor nurse, see Rosasco, Collective Bargaining:What's a DirectorofNursing to Do?, HosPrrALS, Sept. 16, 1974,
at 79; Bloom, Collective Action by ProfessionalsPosesProblesforAdministrators,HOsPITALs, Mar. 16, 1977, at 167. See generalo 1 B. WERNE, THE LAW AND PRIVATE PRACTICE
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR RELATIONS 466-67 (1974); J. STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH, POLICY 217 (1973); TheANA: Can a ProfessionalAssocia-

tion be a Trade Union, Too?, HOSPITALS, Sept. 1, 1974, at 103.
131. See notes 11-18 & accompanying text supra.
132. Matthew 6:24 (King James version).
133. Organized labor suffered at the hands of its own intransigence; by opposing any
and all amendments to the Wagner Act, it had virtually no impact upon the inevitable TaftHartley amendments. Management, on the other hand, buoyed by anti-union public sentiment, had considerable influence upon the legislation. See SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS
LAW, A.B.A., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 35-46 (1971).
134. See text accompanying notes 11-30 supra.
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course the conflict of interest applied to employees as well. The Board
moved swiftly to their defense when the actions of employers' supervi-

sors appeared to threaten employees' rights to form a union independ-

135
ent of employer domination.
The stage was set for the examination of allegations of supervisory
domination when raised at union representation hearings. Supervisors
were a "suspect class"; the Board and reviewing courts were prepared
to scrutinize the degree of influence they might assert in the collective

bargaining forum. Despite utmost preparedness, or perhaps because of
it, the most recent appellate court opinion concerning supervisory domination missed the mark. The Court in Anne Arundel attempted no
close examination of the employer or employee interests at stake, yet
the decision overturned the employees' clear choice of a bargaining

representative.
To pin the blame upon the court's factual analysis of supervisory
influence would obscure the error. The Board, too, though it arrived at
the opposite result, was burdened by the same analytic framework.
Both Board and court, by measuring the degree of supervisory involvement, were analyzing potential domination, hence perpetuating the increasingly dysfunctional doctrine of supervisory domination.

Supervisory involvement in union activities presupposes an inherent conflict of interest. This conflict of interest led to their ostracism
from the protections provided to rank and file employees under the
NLRA, and justifies concern over their presence within unions today.
Yet supervisors have played integral roles in the development of sev-

eral types of modern unions. 136 Nonsupervisory employees consist-

135. See text accompanying notes 31-59 supra.
136. Public-sector, nurses', and building and craft unions have traditionally included
supervisors as members and often as leaders. The inclusion of supervisors in public-sector
and nurses' unions is a result of similar organizing trends within these occupations. Both
groups of employees embraced collective bargaining comparatively recently. However, employee associations organized by employees of a particular occupation to promote purely
professional and educational goals had long been in existence in the public-sector and nursing fields. Supervisors, who share a common interest with rank and file employees in the
upgrading of their particular occupations and who often possess superior expertise and educational training in a given field, were an integral fixture of such employee associations. See
generally Epstein & Stickler, The Nurse as a Professionaland as a Unionist, HOSPITALS,
January 16, 1976 at 44-48; J. STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE,
GROWTH, POLICY 1-13, 33-34, 100-01, 217 (1973).
When public sector employees and nurses began to push for collective bargaining, these
existing employee associations provided a ready-made organizational framework for union
organizing. Hence the associations simply expanded their functions to include collective
bargaining.
Supervisors, because of their management status, have been insulated from direct contact with the collective bargaining functions. See discussion concerning delegation of collective bargaining duties in text accompanying notes 110-29 supra. See generally J. STIEBER,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH, POLICY 222 (1973). However, their
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ently vote to be represented by these unions, undeterred by the
potential conflicts posed by supervisory involvement. Such clear expressions of employee approval of these unions should not, and need
not, be stymied by a doctrine originally created to protect employee
freedom of choice.
Failure to certify a union because of supervisory participation,
without a showing of actual domination by the employer, acts to frustrate employees' exercise of their section 7 rights. The proposals which
follow are designed to safeguard these employee rights, as well as to
protect employers from any conflicts occasioned by the union involvement of their supervisors.
Proposals
The doctrine of supervisory domination should be discarded. Orphaned in the years since their inception, the principles underlying the
doctrine will regain significance only when reunited with their parent
policy: section 8(a)(2)'s prohibition against employer domination.
Henceforth, at both section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice hearings, and
representation hearings, supervisory participation in union affairs
should be considered as a factor only to the extent that supervisors are
shown to be acting in the employer's interests, thereby enabling the
employer to dominate or interfere with the union. Most importantly,
when considering whether a union is dominated by the employer, either in the context of a section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice charge or at
long standing membership in these associations and the important role they had traditionally assumed in advancing the professional and educational status of their respective occupations seemingly mandated their continued membership. Today, these public-sector and
nurses' professional associations still view supervisors as a valuable element of their memberships and as a presence prerequisite to the associations' satisfactory representation of
their professions' entire membership and goals. See generally Despres, .4 Lawyer Explains
What the NationalLabor Relations Act Really Says, AM. J. NuRs., May 1976, at 794; J.
STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH, POLICY 33-34, 100-01
(1973).
The building and craft unions traditionally have included supervisors as union members and in rank and file bargaining units. See court's discussion of industry practice in
Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174, 180-82 (1957); Detroit Ass'n of
Plumbing Contractors, 126 N.L.R.B. 1381, 1389-95 (1960). The status of supervisors in such
industries is variable, with workers assuming different positions and titles on a job to job
basis. Hence a worker appointed foreman on one job may be designated journeyman on the
next. See Detroit Ass'n of Plumbing Contractors, 126 N.L.R.B. 1381, 1389, 1394 (1960). In
addition, these workers are normally contracted by an employer on an individual job basis
so that a supervisor's "identification with an individual employer is minimal and temporary,
lasting only so long as he works on a given job." G. BERTRAM & S. MAISEL, INDUSTRLAL
RELATIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTON INDUSTRY 1 (1955). A rational basis for extending
union membership to supervisors exists in building trade unions as well as a personal impetus on the part of the individual supervisors to retain their union memberships.
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a representation hearing, the Board should require a showing of actual
domination as was propounded in the line of circuit court decisions
leading up to Hertzka & Knowles v. N.LAB. 137 In particular, the presumption that supervisory involvement in union activities constitutes
employer domination or interference must be rejected.
Further, the Board should be vested with sole power to police employer domination at the representation hearing. No other party to the
hearing should be granted standing to assert this charge. Obviously,
employers' allegations of employer domination are inappropriate. Employees, having authorized the union to represent them, are unlikely to
oppose its certification.1 38 Rival unions that have legitimate concerns
about employer domination should utilize the NLRA machinery of objections to elections or section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice charges.
In the following sections, the adequacy of protection given the interests of the employer, employee, and national labor policy will be
tested in light of these proposals.
Protecting Employers' Interests
The Rochester139 case added to the scope of a representation hearing concern for the employer's interest in the undivided loyalty of its
management personnel. Thus, the Board-created policy against supervisory domination broadened to protect both employers' and employees' interests. But three years after the Board had expanded the
representation hearing into a forum in which employers could assert
conflicts of interest raised by their supervisors' union involvement,
Congress created a specific remedy to resolve this conflict. The TaftHartley amendments excluded supervisors from the definition of employees in section 2(3) and expressly included section 14(a) to underscore the employer's right to the undivided loyalty of its supervisors. 140
In removing supervisors from the Act's protection, section 14(a) grants
an employer the right to demand that its supervisors abstain from
137. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975). See notes 60-78 &
accompanying text supra.
138. Although there may be individual employees that do not support certification of
the union, present Board policy is to deny intervention in the representation hearing to a
group of employees who do not wish any union to represent them, Central Carolina Farmers
Exchange, Inc., 115 N.L.R.B. 1250 (1956), and to individual employees who do not seek to
serve as bargaining representative, Alaska Salmon Indus., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1949).
Rival unions, however, may contest another union's certification, subject to several administrative qualifications. See Representation Hearing Regulations § 202.5 (1977). See also K.
McGuiNnss, How TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (4th
ed. 1976).
139. 56 N.L.R.B. 1709 (1945).
140. See text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
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union activity on pain of discharge.1 41
The United States Supreme Court in FloridaPower & Light Company v. IBEW142 emphasized that section 14(a) was and is Congress'
response to an employer's fear of disloyal supervisors. 143 The Court
stressed that no right of action against the union for permitting supervisory membership was intended or provided. When an employer contests a union's certification at a representation hearing upon the ground
that supervisory membership presents a conflict to its interest in loyal
supervisors, the employer is in effect bringing an action against the
union. Congress has provided the employer with section 14(a) to avoid
this problem. The Supreme Court's decision in FloridaPower & Light
Co. v. IBEW supports the proposition that Congress preempted the
representation hearing as a forum in which to protect employers' interest inthe loyalty of their supervisors. 144
Employers have alleged in addition that their interests may be
harmed by the presence of other employers' supervisors in the union.
Section 14(a), which addresses an employer's concern for the loyalty of
its own supervisors, would not remedy this situation. In his dissent in
Anne Arundel, Judge Craven considered the employer-hospital's contention that union-member supervisors of competitorhospitals might be
"tempted to use their positions to advance the competitive position of
their own hospitals as against the Employer." 145 Judge Craven minimized the likelihood of such an event, concluding that the employer's
interests were adequately protected. 146
141. Beasley v. Food Fair at North Carolina, 416 U.S. 653 (1974). The Supreme Court
upheld an employer's right to fire his supervisors for their union activity.
142. 417 U.S. 790 (1974). See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
143. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790, 809-13 (1974). This position
was also taken by Judge Craven in his Anne Arundel dissent: "If this Employer's concern
with supervisory domination is genuine, it comes some 30 years too late.... Taft-Hartley,
as interpreted in Beasley, has all but eliminated genuine employer concern with union activity by its supervisors. For this reason alone, any asserted fear of erosion of management
prerogatives is untenable." N.L.R.B. v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524,
529-30 (4th Cir. 1977).
144. 417 U.S. 790 (1974). But cf the majority opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524, 536 n.7 (4th Cir. 1977), in which the court described an
employer's refusal to bargain with a union of which his supervisors were members as an
"alternative, less drastic remedy" to the use of § 14(a).
This Note posits that since the employees' right to bargain collectively is explicitly recognized by the Act while supervisors are excluded from protection, the more drastic remedy
in terms of the Act is to deny employees use of the collective bargaining process.
145. Id. at 531. See also Respondent's brief submitted to original panel of three judges
at 27, N.L.R.B. v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977).
146. N.L.R.B. v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524, 531-32 (4th Cir.
1977) (Craven, J., dissenting). Judge Craven pinpointed the lack of any evidence to substantiate such a claim, as well as a dearth of either motive or power on the part of the supervisors
to control bargaining.
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Such claims are vague and highly speculative. At minimum, they
should be measured against a standard synonymous with that advocated by this Note for employees: actual harm to the employer's interests. This Note suggests instead, however, that the employer's legal
recourse be to federal and state trade regulations and accompanying
statutory remedies '47specifically enacted to police such unfair business
practices, 48 and not to the Board via strained applications of the Act's
definitional provisions.

Protecting Employees' Interests
Implementation of the proposals above will not compromise employee independence; rather, it should reinforce employee free choice.
The doctrine of supervisory domination has evolved into a burden
upon, rather than an enforcer of, employee section 7 rights.
As a threshold matter, rank and file employees are free to deny a
supervisor membership in their union or to vote against representation
by a union composed in part of supervisors. Furthermore, the Board
routinely excludes supervisors from employees' units 149 as part of its
commitment to maintaining a community of interest within the bargaining unit.
Abandoning the doctrine of supervisory domination will reemphasize employees' freedom to choose a collective bargaining representative that allows supervisory participation. In contrast, allowing
employers to continue to block union certification by the subterfuge of
supervisory domination 50 might coerce employees into forsaking their
traditional union structures in favor of ones with less professional or
economic power, to ensure certification within the strictures of the doctrine. Once the doctrine against supervisory domination is expunged
from the case law, questions of which union structure to select and how
much supervisory participation to allow will be answered not by the
Board or courts, but by those in whom the primary right guaranteed by
the Act resides, the employees, in free selection of their bargaining
representative.
147. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16758 (West 1964) on the subject of
combinations in restraint of trade.
148. For a discussion of creative uses of an unfair business practice statute in California,
see Howard, Former Cipil Code Section 3369. A Study in JudicialInterpretation, 30 HASTINGs L.J. - (1978).

149. See note 108 supra.
150. Judge Craven noted in his dissent in Anne Arundel "[This case indicates [that] the
asserted conflict of interest [arising from supervisory membership] may simply involve
'some employer seeking to delay or avoid the day he must deal with his employees collectively rather than individually."' N.L.R.B. v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d
524, 533 (4th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974)
(Fanning and Penello, Members, dissenting)).

January 1979]

SUPERVISORY DOMINATION

Lest this freedom suggest undue vulnerability, it is important to
recognize that under these proposals employees and unions would still
possess more than adequate safeguards. Although the proposals do not
grant rival unions the right to allege employer domination at the representation hearing, two other forums for such allegations remain. Rival
unions can file objections to a representation election with the Board,
alleging that employer domination or interference has invalidated the
election as an expression of employee free choice. If employer conduct
or antiunion activities by its supervisors are shown to have upset the
"coercion-free" environment or "laboratory conditions" requisite to a
its inherent
valid exercise of employee choice, the Board may utilize 151
administrative power to postpone or set aside an election.
Alternatively, a rival or incumbent union, or an individual employee, may file section 8(a)(2) charges. Use of this legislatively mandated route should adequately protect union integrity and employee
free choice. Pivotal, certainly, will be the Board's appreciation of its
delicate and integral role in this process.
The Role of the Board
Although employees under the jurisdiction of the NLRA are accorded the "unqualified right" to choose a labor organization of any
kind,152 the Board "has discretion to place appropriate limitations on
151. Under established Board practice, any party has five days after being notified of
the results to file objections to the representation election. The objections may relate to "the
conduct of the election itself (e.g., violation of Board election rules, or breach of secrecy)" or
to campaign activity which may have interfered with a valid exercise of employee free
choice. R.GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIMNG 47 (1976). If the objections are found to be factually substantiated upon review,
the Board may set aside the election results. Id.
The standards for setting aside an election are much less exacting than those required to
make out an unfair labor practice. As phrased by the Board in General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124 (1948), "In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible,
to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees .... When, in the rare extreme case,
the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of others, the requisite laboratory
conditions are not present and the experiment must be conducted over again." Id. at 127.
Although the activity challenged may be that of either party or even of third persons such as
newspapers or townspeople, it must occur subsequent to the filing of the election petition to
warrant consideration by the Board as the basis for an election objection. R. GoRMAN,
BASIc TExT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 46-47 (1976).
Examples of activities that permit the setting aside of an. election are union promises to
employees to waive union initiation fees and back dues if the union wins, Loubella Extendables, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 183 (1973); union threats of bodily harm to employee to sway his
vote, Steak House Meat Co., Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 28 (1973); employer interrogation of employees regarding union membership and views, Birdsall Construction Co., 198 N.L.R.B.
163 (1972); and holding of grocery raffle by employer on day of election, Olympic Products,
Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. 442 (1973).
152. NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524, 529 (1977).
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the choice of bargaining representative should it find that public or
statutory policies so dictate."' 153 In the past, the Board has exercised
this discretion to limit supervisory participation within the union collective bargaining structure, by requiring that petitioning unions qualify as "labor organizations."'' 54 While well-intentioned, these Board
efforts were nevertheless misdirected. This Note suggests that the
Board refocus its attention instead upon employer domination of unions, and apply tests which gauge not potential interference or domination, but require a showing of actual domination, according greater
weight to employees' selection of their union structures than to the degree of management participation in union affairs.
The Ninth Circuit in Hertzka & KnowlesI55 failed to find a section
8(a)(2) violation. The Court would have required evidence that the
employer interfered with the employees' freedom of choice in order to
disturb the employees' choice of bargaining representative. The analysis must be the same at representation hearings. Unless the Board itself
can cite instances of employer interference with or domination of the
employees' freedom of choice, the employees' selection of bargaining
representative must be approved.
This stiffer standard in no way dictates a weaker Board commitment to enforcing employees' fundamental right to be represented by a
union dedicated to their welfare. It was under the existing standards,
with their misleading focus upon degree of supervisory participation,
that the employer in Anne Arundel was able to prevent its employees'
representation at all. Requiring proof of actual employer domination
of employees, which prevents exercise of their section 7 rights, will defeat this tactic, and reaffirm the principle enunciated by the Board in
Nassau: employer domination should be judged subjectively, from the
standpoint of the employees. 156 Employees, now with decades of experience under collective bargaining, are better able to judge for themselves whether supervisory involvement in their union constitutes
employer domination. 57
153. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1947).
154. See notes 81-103 & accompanying text supra.
155. Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 675 (1975).
156. See Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957); NLRB v.
Thompson Prods., 130 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1942); see note 55 & accompanying text supra.
To protect against a "tyranny of one"-the sole employee who feels his or her union is
pejoratively influenced by supervisorial presence-the subjective judgment of employer
domination should be measured by a significant percentage, or majority of the employees.
157. The Board recently reviewed and rejected as an "anachronism" its traditionally
paternalistic attitude toward employees as "naive and unworldly" in Shopping Kart Food
Market, 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1313 (1977).
In this landmark decision the Board held that it would no longer probe into the truth or
falsity of union representation campaign statements, nor set aside elections on the basis
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Effectuating employees' free choice of their bargaining representative should still be the Board's primary consideration. For too long, the
Board's focus at the representation hearing has been upon union structure, such as whether a union includes supervisors as members, leading
the Board and reviewing courts into problematical analyses of potential
conflicts of interest. The Board should disturb the employees' selection
of their bargaining representative only upon a clear showing of employer interference with or domination of the union, or the employees'
selection of their union.
Application of these stricter standards at the representation hearing will expedite the certification and collective bargaining processes.
If it later appears to employees that their bargaining representative is
employer dominated, the Board's policing role will be appropriately
addressed to post-certification section 8(a)(2) unfair labor practice
charges or de-certification petitions. 15
Conclusion
It is a canon of Anglo-American jurisprudence that legal doctrines
and rules should be constructed to maintain a balance among competing interests, an equilibrium compatible with a recognition of all of
them. The best solution is one which "maintain[s] the whole scheme of
interests with the least impairment of the whole. ' 159 Against this towering goal must the doctrine of supervisory domination be measured.
In its original design, the doctrine was such an holistic attempt to harmonize the competing interests of employer and employees. During
the intervening years, however, employer interests have been granted
independent protection via Congressional amendment. Employees,
whose interests the doctrine ostensibly protects, are protected no
longer, instead its operation frustrates satisfaction of employees'
interests.
Since conflicts which reach the appellate levels of our judicial systhereof. The Board stated: "We decline to join those who would continue to regulate on the
basis of such assumptions [that employees are naive and unworldly] notwithstanding 'improvements in our educational processes, and despite the fact that our elections have now
become almost commonplace in the industrial world so that the degree of employee sophistication in these matters has doubtless risen substantially during the years of this Act's existence. . .

.'

Rather, we believe that Board rules in this area must be based on a view of

employees as mature individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for
what it is and discounting it." Id. at 1313 (citation omitted).
158. The Board may amend, clarify or revoke certification. Petitions for decertification
may be filed by "an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization
acting in their behalf." NLRA § 9(c)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(l)(A)(ii). See also NLRB
Rules and Regulations §§ 102.60, 102.61 (b), (c), (d).
159. L Pound, The Securing of Interests § 15 in JURISPRUDENC E 330-32 (1959), C
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930).
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tern are closely contended and require finely honed analysis, there always exists the possibility that absorption with the analysis will obscure
the greater issues. It is not the mere spectre of supervisory domination
but rather actual harm to employees through employer domination
which is the evil sought to be eradicated. To focus on anything less
allows misleading allegations of supervisory domination to impede employees' section 7 rights and brings to a halt the collective bargaining
process. The right to bargain collectively is the fundamental purpose
underlying the NLRA and the legal principle most deserving of application in these circumstances.
The proposals presented in this Note are designed to protect both
employer and employee interests without fundamentally impinging
upon the rights or interests of either. The whole scheme of interests
will best be accomodated, and labor relations fair to both employer and
employees attained, by discarding the doctrine of supervisory
domination.

